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I.

INTRODUCTION

In September 1987, there were nearly 4,000,000 outstanding
security clearances in the United States, granted by some 20 federal
departments and agencies. 1 The total value of defense contracts the
previous year in Santa Clara County, California, alone was
$4,155,996,000.2 Of the outstanding clearances, therefore, it stands
to reason that a substantial number are held by employees of Silicon
Valley companies, which act as contractors for the U.S. Department of Defense ("Defense Department" or "D.O.D.") and the
U.S. Department of Energy ("D.O.E").
The nature of defense contracting is such that, without access
to classified information, applicants at many levels cannot obtain
work. Although having a security clearance does not guarantee access to classified information, access is granted only to persons with
the appropriate clearance and whose official duties require such access.3 Security clearance is granted to employees of defense contractors because it has been determined that those positions require
access to classified information.4 The corollary is that an employee
whose security clearance is revoked and whose job entails access to
classified information will be out of a job.5
Under normal circumstances, a personnel security clearance
remains valid until the individual has no further official relationship
with the defense contractor or until "regular access to [that] level of
classified information for which the individual holds a clearance is6
no longer necessary in the normal course of his or her duties."
Several events can trigger a full reinvestigation, however, and peril. Greve, How Security Risks Slip Into System: Critics Say Top-Secret Clearance Is
Easier To Get Than Credit Card, S.J. Mercury News, Sept. 6, 1987, at 19A.
2. "Top 25 Defense Contractors in Santa Clara County - Ranked by 1986 Contracts
Awarded," 8.L Business Journal, Sept. 28, 1987.
3. 32 C.F.R. § 154.49(a). See also infra text accompanying notes 86 & 87.
4. 32 C.F.R. § 154.47(c).
5.

See, e.g., Smith v. Schlesinger, 513 F.2d 462, 465 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (aerospace engi-

neer required clearance to begin employment with government contractor); see also Doe v.
Weinberger, 820 F.2d 1275, 1277 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert pending sub. nom. Carlucci v. Doe,
No. 87-751 (security clearance a prerequisite to work at the National Security Agency).
6. 32 C.F.R. § 154.48(b).
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odic reviews are scheduled, if not always performed.7 One possible
result is that the individual will not only be denied access to higher
level classified information, but will lose any security clearance he
then holds.' The rationale behind this is not entirely clear, since the
standards for Secret and Top Secret clearance are more stringent
than the standards for Confidential clearance.9 Presumably, however, if access to classified information is not justified at the highest
levels, it is not advisable at any level.
The case law in this area uniformly addresses the situation
where some action on the part of the employee has - rightfully or
wrongfully - resulted in the revocation or denial of that person's
clearance for access to classified information. No cases have involved an act or omission on the employer's part which resulted in
the revocation of an employee's security clearance." ° The practical
effect of any revocation of clearance, however, is that finding another job with a defense contractor will be very difficult, and the
employee will have to choose between working in another field
within the industry, or working outside the industry. In Silicon
Valley, that might not be a choice at all.
The Defense Department and the D.O.E. have somewhat different rules regarding the grant and review of security clearances.
This article focuses on the Defense Department regulations, and
then compares them with the D.O.E. procedures. The article's goal
is to clarify for employees of defense contractors the remedies available to them upon revocation of their security clearance, and the
criteria which the federal government agencies use to make such
determinations. This article does not address the myriad of reasons
for which an employee may lose his job or his remedies should removal be caused by any event other than loss of security clearance.
7.

32 C.F.R. § 154.19.

8. 32 C.F.R. § 155.3 See infra note 84 and accompanying text.
9. See 32 C.F.R. Part 154, App. C, "Tables for Requesting Investigations," detailing
varying degrees of investigation depending on the applicant's duties.
10. By contrast, Government employees in the "competitive service" are guaranteed

that the fact that they are removed from employment on national security grounds will not
preclude them from seeking or accepting employment in any other United States agency. 5
U.S.C.S. § 7312. "Competitive service" is defined as (1) all civil service positions in the executive branch except those positions (A) which are specifically exempted by some other statute, (B) which are confirmed by the Senate, or (C) with the Senior Executive Service; (2) all
civil service positions not in the executive branch which are specifically included in the competitive service by statute; and (3) positions in the government of the District of Columbia
which are specifically included by statute. Id. § 2102. "Competitive service" is the same as
"classified [civil] service." Id. § 2102(c).
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STATUTORY LAW

A.

U.S. Constitution

No person has a constitutional or statutory "right" to a security clearance." At the same time, the Fifth Amendment of the
United States Constitution states that no person shall be deprived of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law. This "due process clause" protects the "right to hold specific employment and to
follow a chosen profession free from unreasonable governmental
interference." 12
The national security reasons behind the grant or denial of security clearance were once believed to override the due process protection of the Constitution. Then in 1959, the U.S. Supreme Court
was prevailed upon to decide the case of an aeronautical engineer
whose industrial employment depended upon having access to classified information - and whose security clearance the Government
13
attempted to revoke.
The action against the employee in Greene v. McElroy14 was
based on certain confidential reports which were never made available to the employee, 5 and the employee was given no opportunity
to cross-examine adverse witnesses.1 6 The Supreme Court found
that such proceedings were too far removed from traditional notions of due process to stand unless they were clearly authorized.
The Court did not reach the constitutional issue, holding instead
that there was no clear Congressional or Presidential authorization
for the procedures, 7 and that the attempted revocation of clearance
failed on that basis.
B. Executive Order 10865
The following year, in the wake of the Greene decision, President Eisenhower issued Executive Order 10865, "Safeguarding
Classified Information Within Industry" (the "Order").II The Order contains two basic premises. First, it sets the framework for the
"Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program," which
11. Dept. of the Navy v. Egan, - U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 818, 824 (1988).
12. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 492, 79 S.Ct. 1400, 1411 (1959).
13. Id. The distinction between having a security clearance and being granted access to
classified information is discussed infra text accompanying notes 86 & 87.

14. 360 U.S. 474, 79 S. Ct. 1400.
15. 360 U.S. at 479-480, 487, 79 S. Ct. at 1405, 1409.
16. Id. at 497, 79 S. Ct. at 1414.
17. Id. at 507-508, 79 S. Ct. at 1419.
18. Exec. Order No. 10865, 3 C.F.R. 62 (1960), as amended by Exec. Order No. 10909,
3 C.F.R. 75 (1961), reprinted in 50 U.S.C.S. § 401 note at 142-47.
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is administered by the Department of Defense, and equivalent programs administered by other Government agencies. The Industrial
Personnel Security Clearance Review Program is discussed below,
at III(B). Second, the Order sets forth a minimum standard for the
process due any employee whose security clearance may be denied
or revoked. Employees of U.S. industries which contract with the
Department of Defense are subject to the Order by virtue of the
following language:1 9
[R]egulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense under subsection (a) of this section may be extended to apply to protect
releases (1) of classified information to or within United States
industry that relate to bidding, or the negotiation, award, performance, or termination of contracts with [any] other department or agency [of the United States], and (2) other releases of
classified information to or within industry, which such other department or agency has responsibility for safeguarding.
"Due process" under the Order consists of the following procedural safeguards:
1. a written statement of reasons why access to classified information may be denied or revoked ("Statement of Reasons");
2. an opportunity to reply in writing;
3. an opportunity for a hearing after filing a written reply to the
Statement of Reasons;
4. reasonable time to prepare for the hearing;
5. the opportunity to be represented by counsel;
6. the opportunity to cross-examine persons on any matters
(with a limitation on the disclosure of classified information)
raised in the Statement of Reasons, other than the characterization of any organization or individual other than the applicant;
and
7. written notice of the final decision concerning the allegations
contained in the Statement of Reasons.20
The Order authorizes the Secretary of Defense to delegate to
the Deputy or Assistant Secretary of Defense the responsibility for
ensuring that access to classified information is available only if it is
clearly consistent with the national interest.2 ' The Secretary of Defense is further authorized to "prescribe such specific requirements,
restrictions, and other safeguards as [he] consider[s] necessary to
protect (1) releases of classified information to or within United
19. Exec. Order No. 10909, 3 C.F.R. 75, § 1(b).
20. Id. at § 3.
21. Id. at § 2.

COMPUTER &HIGH TECHNOLOGYL4WJOURNL

[Vol. 4

States industry .... ",22

III.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PROCEDURES

A. Criteriafor Granting Security Clearance: Personnel
Security Program
The decision whether to grant personnel security clearance to
employees of defense contractors has two stages. The second stage,
relating to due process and the method of appeal, is the main focus
of this Article. To understand that process, however it is necessary
to understand the initial investigation and review process. This is so
for two reasons: one, applications reach the appeal level only by
virtue of a determination made at the investigation level, and two,
much of the policy for the appeal process is established in the statute which governs initial investigation.
The employee of a defense contractor who requires security
clearance to conduct his work must apply for that clearance
through the Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program.23 Each applicant, defined as "a person in industry
who requires a security clearance for access to classified information,"" is investigated in accordance with the standards of two Defense Department publications:25 the Department of Defense
Personnel Security Program ("Personnel Security Program") 26 and
the Industrial Security Regulation27 .
The Personnel Security Program prescribes the Defense Department policy and procedures for granting access, as distinguished from reviewing the decision to grant access, to classified
information and employment in sensitive positions by industry contractor personnel, and specifies the nature and extent of the investi22. Id. at § l(a).
23. "Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program," D.O.D. Directive 5220.6, 32 C.F.R. Part 155 (July 1, 1987 Ed.) (Part 155 was proposed to be amended
on May 6, 1987, but the amendments still have not been adopted. Unless otherwise indicated, references are to the codification and not to the proposed rules.).
24. 32 C.F.R. § 155.3.
25. Id. § 155.6(a).
26. "Personnel Security Program," D.O.D. 5200.2-R, 32 C.F.R. Part 154 (Apr. 8,
1987).
27. "Industrial Security Regulation," D.O.D. 5220.22-R. At the date of publication of
this Article, the author has been unable to obtain a copy of D.O.D. 5220.22-R. Section 155.6
of D.O.D. Directive 5220.6 (7-1-86 Edition) instructed that copies could be obtained from the
U.S. Naval Publications and Forms Center. That office informed the author that it did not
have the document. As proposed to be amended on May 6, 1987, Section 155.6 instructs that
requests for investigation under D.O.D. 5220.22-R should be submitted to the Office of the
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Pentagon, Wash. D.C. 20301. 52 Fed. Reg. 18,865
(May 6, 1987).
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gative scope required for security clearance.2 8 The criteria applied
in making the decision are reproduced at Appendix A to this
Article.
Investigations under the Personnel Security Program are conducted by the Defense Investigative Service ("DIS") or the Defense
Industrial Clearance Office ("DISCO").2 9 DIS is a separate "law
enforcement, personnel security investigative, and industrial security agency" of the Department of Defense under the direction, authority, and control of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy.30 DIS administers the Defense Industrial Security Program
("Industrial Security Program"),3 1 and is responsible for security
clearance investigations within the 50 States, the District of Columbia and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.3 2 The Director of DIS
operates the Industrial Security Program as a separate element on
behalf of all D.O.D. components.3 3 Within that structure, overall
responsibility for policy and administration lies with the Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense (Policy Review). 34 The Director of
DIS is authorized to clear DIS personnel "and such other individu-

als as may be appropriate" for access to classified Defense Department material and information in accordance with the provisions of
the Personnel Security Program. 35 DISCO is operated within DIS
as a "consolidated central facility to process industrial security
clearances." 3 6
As a rule, security clearance should be granted if, based on all
available information, the applicant's loyalty, reliability, and trustworthiness are such that entrusting the person with classified information or assigning the person to sensitive duties is clearly
28. 32 C.F.R. Part 154, Summary.
29. "Defense Investigative Service," D.O.D. Directive 5105.42, 32 C.F.R. Part 361
(Nov. 2, 1987).
30. 32 C.F.R. § 361.3(a).
31. "D.O.D. Industrial Security Program," D.O.D. Directive 5220.22 (Dec. 8, 1980),
Govt. Cont. Rep. (CCH) para. 700, p. 1403; 32 C.F.R. § 361.4(d). The Defense Industrial
Security Program is regulated by the Industrial Security Regulation, D.O.D. 5220.22-R.
32. D.O.D. Directive 5105.42 supra note 29 assigns responsibility to DIS; 32 C.F.R.
§ 154.9(a) states the jurisdiction of the DIS.
33. D.O.D. Directive 5220.22(D)(3), supra note 31, at 1404. "D.O.D. Components" is
defined generally as the Office of the Secretary of Defense; the Military Departments; Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Defense Agencies. 32 C.F.R. § 155.2(a); D.O.D.
Directive 5220.22(B), supra note 31, at para. 700.10; 32 C.F.R. § 154.2(f) (the latter definition includes only the Directors, not other personnel, of Defense Agencies, and adds Directors of the Unified and Specified Commands).
34. D.O.D. Directive 5220.22(D)(1), supra note 31, at 1404.
35. 32 C.F.R. Part 361, App. A, para. 7.
36. Id. § 361.4(e).
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consistent with the interests of national security. 37
Security clearance should be granted only to those persons who
require access to classified information for "mission accomplishment," and only when such access is required in connection with
official duties.38 The investigation is necessarily subjective, and the
goal is simply to "judge whether the circumstances of a particular
case, taking into consideration prior experience with similar cases,
reasonably suggest a degree of probability of prejudicial behavior
not consistent with the national security." 3 9
If clearance is granted, there is no further review. If clearance
is denied (or revoked following a reinvestigation), the decision will
be reviewed as set forth below.
B. Review Process: Defense IndustrialPersonnelSecurity
ClearanceReview Program
1. Application
In 1966, the Department of Defense promulgated the D.O.D.
Industrial Security Program, which implements Executive Order
10865, and established the Defense Industrial Personnel Security
Clearance Review Program ("Clearance Review Program"). 4 By
consent, the following agencies not otherwise associated with the
Department of Defense participate in the Clearance Review
41
Program:
Department of Agriculture
Department of Commerce
Department of Interior
Department of Justice
Department of Labor
Department of State
Department of Transportation
Department of Treasury
Environmental Protection Agency
Federal Emergency Management Agency
Federal Reserve System
General Accounting Office
General Services Administration
37. Id. §§ 154.6(b), 154.40(a).
38. Id. § 154.16(1), (2).
39. Id. § 154.40(b).
40.
41.

D.O.D. Directive 5220.22, supra note 31; D.O.D. Directive 5220.6, supra note 23.
32 C.F.R. § 155.2(b).
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National Aeronautics and Space Administration
National Science Foundation
Small Business Administration
United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
United States Information Agency
Notably absent is the Department of Energy, which is responsible for atomic weaponry, and which has promulgated independent
regulations.4 2
The Clearance Review Program covers requests for security
clearance referred by the DIS or DISCO pursuant to the Personnel
Security Program, and can be extended to other cases at the direction of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.4 3 If DIS
or DISCO cannot affirmatively determine that it is "clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for access to classified information" by a person employed by
U.S. industry,' they refer the case to the Directorate for Industrial
Security Clearance Review ("DISCR") for action under the Clearance Review Program.' The Clearance Review Program does not
apply to an administrative revocation of security clearance, discussed below."
Any person in industry who requires a security clearance for
access to classified information (defined as an "applicant" under the
Clearance Review Program) is investigated in accordance with the
standards set forth in the Personnel Security Program.4 7 The Personnel Security Program generally applies to investigations of contractor personnel and other personnel who are affiliated with the
Department of Defense, but "unfavorable administrative action
procedures" (adverse action taken as the result of security clearance
determinations)4 8 are appealed in accordance with the procedures
of the Clearance Review Program and the Industrial Security
Regulation.4 9
The Clearance Review Program contains a binding "adjudication policy" which controls any determination of eligibility for ac42. Greve, supra note 1, at 19A, col. 2. The regulations for the Department of Energy
are found at 10 C.F.R. Parts 706, 710 and 725. The D.O.E. regulations are discussed infra
text accompanying notes 141-184.
43. 32 C.F.R. § 155.2(e).
44. Id. § 155.2(c).
45. Id.; id. § 155.7(a).
46. Id. § 155.2(d). See infra text accompanying notes 86-96.
47. 32 C.F.R. §§ 155.6(a), 155.3.
48. Id. § 154.2(cc).

49. Id. § 154.2(b).
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cess to classified information or assignment to sensitive duties. 50
National security is paramount in any adjudication under the Clearance Review Program, and the standard for granting clearance is
that to do so would be "clearly consistent with the interests of national security.""1 The adjudication policy is keyed to the criteria
for granting initial clearance.5 2
2.

Investigation

The Clearance Review Program essentially tracks the minimum due process standards set out in Executive Order 10865.
DISCO reviews any person in U.S. industry who applies for security clearance. 3 If DISCO determines that it is "clearly consistent
with the national interest" for the person to have access to classified
information, then there is no further review. If there is an adverse
determination, the case is referred to DISCR for administrative review under the Clearance Review Program. 4
DISCR may investigate, direct written interrogatories, require
psychiatric evaluation, conduct interviews with any individual
whose security clearance is being considered, and finally, recommend suspension of security clearance.5 5
Pending completion of the investigation, the Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy may suspend the applicant's security clearance with the concurrence of the Department of General
Counsel ("D.O.D. Counsel"), if there is "sufficient information to
provide a reasonable basis for concluding that an applicant's continued access to classified information could endanger the national
'5 6
interest."
During the course of investigation, written or oral statements
adverse to the applicant may be received and considered without
affording the applicant an opportunity to cross-examine if D.O.D.
Counsel determines (a) that "the statement concerned appears to be
reliable and material," (b) that failure to consider the statement
"would be substantially harmful to the national security," and (c)
50. Id. § 155.6(f).
51. Id. § 155.8(a).
52. Id. The criteria for determining eligibility for clearance appear id. § 155.6(e), and
are duplicated id. § 154.7. They are reprinted at Appendix A hereof.
53. Id. § 155.2(c). DISCO has investigative authority pursuant to 32 C.F.R. Part 361,
and conducts its investigation in accordance with 32 C.F.R. Part 154.
54. 32 C.F.R. § 155.2(c).
55. Id. § 155.7(b).
56. Id. § 155.6(g). The roles of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and
the D.O.D. General Counsel may be delegated to their "designees."
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that the person who made the statement is unavailable to testify
"due to some.., cause determined by the Secretary of Defense, or
57
when appropriate, by the agency head to be good and sufficient."
If the head of the department supplying the statement certifies that
disclosure of an informant's identity would be substantially harmful
to the national interest, the D.O.D. Counsel is not required to make
any determination as to admissibility of evidence supplied by the
informant.18 Physical evidence other than classified investigative
reports, which are unavailable for inspection by the applicant, may
be received in evidence if D.O.D. Counsel determines that it appears to be material and that failure to receive and consider it would
be "substantially harmful" to the national security. 9 The Constitutional guarantee of due process is not triggered by this fact-finding
investigation.'
3. Hearing: Post-Investigation
When the investigation is completed, DISCR must either (a)
issue a written notice that it has determined that the applicant's
access to classified information is "clearly consistent with the national interest" and rescind any suspension of the applicant's security clearance; or (b) serve the applicant with a Statement of Reasons
which clearly outlines the further procedures available to the applicant, including the right to counsel.6 1 No security clearance may be
revoked unless the applicant receives a written Statement of Reasons "as detailed and comprehensive as the national security
permits."'62
Upon receiving the Statement of Reasons, in order to be entitled to a hearing, the applicant must: (a) request a hearing, and (b)
reply in writing to the Statement of Reasons.63 The reply must admit or deny each listed allegation (a general denial is not sufficient),
must be specific, and must be submitted to DISCR within 20 days
of receipt of the Statement of Reasons."4 If the applicant fails to
answer the Statement of Reasons in a responsive manner, the Director of DISCR will deny the requested clearance and any clearance
57. 32 C.F.R. § 155.6(i).
58. Id.

59. Id. § 155.6(h).
60. Clifford v. Shoultz, 413 F.2d 868 (9th Cir. 1969), cert denied 396 U.S. 962, 90 S.Ct.
426 (1969).

61. Id. 32 C.F.R. § 155.7(c).
62. Id.
63. Id. § 155.7(d).
64. Id. The applicant may petition the Director of DISCR for a "reasonable
extension."
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then held by the applicant will be administratively suspended.6 5
If the applicant answers the Statement of Reasons but does not
request a hearing - and if counsel to DISCR does not request a
hearing - the Examiner (an attorney assigned to DISCR to conduct hearings and reach clearance determinations) 6" will make a determination regarding the applicant's security clearance based upon
a review of the file of "all relevant material., 67 A copy of that file is
provided to the applicant, who then has twenty days to submit a
rebuttal in the form of documentary information, or to explain any
applicant
adverse information in the file. After receiving the file, the
68
may not change his mind and elect to have a hearing.
If a review of the applicant's reply to the Statement of Reasons
indicates that all the allegations are unfounded, or if there is insufficient evidence to proceed in accordance with the adjudication policy, the Director of DISCR will take action "as appropriate under
the circumstances. ' 69 The applicant must be notified in writing, of
either of these actions taken without a hearing.70
If the applicant answers the Statement of Reasons responsively, and if the applicant or counsel to DISCR requests a hearing,
the hearing takes place before Examiners, who are designated by
D.O.D. Counsel.7 1 This hearing meets all the procedural safeguards required by Executive Order 10865.72 The applicant has the
right to counsel, to present evidence, and generally to cross-examine
adverse witnesses.7 3 All parties to the hearing are served with a
copy of any pleading or communication at the time it is submitted
to the Examiner.74 The applicant's failure to appear or proceed "in
a timely and orderly fashion," or failure or refusal to answer or
authorize others to answer relevant material questions will result in
dismissal of the case, denial of any pending request for clearance,
and suspension of any security clearance then held by the
applicant.75
D.O.D. Counsel is responsible for producing the witnesses and
information upon which DISCR has relied to establish controverted
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. §
Id. §
Id. §
Id.
Id. §

155.7(f).
155.5(b)(4).
155.7(e).

70.
71.
72.
73.

Id.
Id. § 155.5(b).
See generally id. § 155.7; Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. at 474.
32 C.F.R. § 155.7(g).

155.7(f).

74. Id. § 155.7(i).

75. Id. § 155.70).
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facts alleged in the Statement of Reasons.7 6 As dictated by the evidence presented, the Statement of Reasons may be amended at the
hearing to make it conform to the information' or evidence
presented, and the applicant may have additional time to answer
the amendments and to present evidence.7 7
The Federal Rules of Evidence are used in these hearings only
as a guide, so that a full record may be developed without technical
omissions. Thus, any relevant and material oral, documentary, or
other evidence may be received.7 8 Information furnished by an investigative agency pursuant to its responsibilities in assisting to safeguard classified information with the industry may also be received
in evidence, provided that such information consists of records
compiled in the regular course of business or other physical evidence other than investigative reports.7 9
4.

Written Findings: Determination

After the hearing, the applicant and D.O.D. Counsel receive a
transcript.80 The Examiner must make written findings with respect to each allegation in the Statement of Reasons, together with
reasons supporting those findings, within thirty days following the
close of the hearing record. The Examiner's determination is based
on the standard of whether it is clearly consistent with the national
interest to grant or continue the applicant's eligibility for access to
classified information. 8 ' The Examiner's determination may be
appealed. 2
Every determination, favorable or otherwise, is entered into an
automated subsystem of the Defense Central Index of Investigations, and that record will be consulted the next time the applicant
requests renewed or higher clearance. 83
76. Id. § 155.7(k).
77. Id.
78. Id. § 155.7(n); but see Gayer v. Schlesinger, 490 F.2d 740, 747, at n.13 (D.C. Cir.
1973), citing Camero v. United States, 375 F.2d 777 (Ct. Cl. 1967) ("In providing for an
adversary agency hearing traditional requirements assuring a fair and impartial adjudication
are to be complied with, notwithstanding [former] 32 C.F.R. § 155.7(c)(1) which states with
respect to such hearings, the rules, including the rules of evidence ... are not applicable to

hearings under this part'.").
79. 32 C.F.R. § 155.7(o).
80. Id. § 155.7(p).
81. Id. § 155.7(q).

82. See infra text accompanying notes 106-119.
83. Id. § 154.43(a), § 154.2(e).
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C. Administrative Loss of Clearance
A basic premise of both the Personnel Security Program and

the Clearance Review Program is that security clearance will be revoked or downgraded administratively when the government contractor no longer does work which requires that its employees have
access to classified information, or when the employee is transferred

to another location or job which does not require such access, or
which requires only lower-level access.8 4 Access to confidential in-

formation by industrial and commercial entities is permitted only to
personnel who have the requisite security clearance, and then only

if access is "essential to a function that is necessary in the interest of
the national security." The applicant must be cleared in accordance
with the Industrial Security Regulations. 85 Employees whose duties
no longer require access to classified information are not eligible for
security clearance.8 6
The Personnel Security Program dictates that the number of

people with security clearances should be kept to a minimum, as
required by the specific job. "Special attention" is to be given to
"eliminating unnecessary clearances." 87 Among those who are not
eligible for clearance are persons whose regular duties do not re-

quire authorized access to classified information, even for their ease
of movement within restricted, controlled, or industrial areas, and

persons who can be prevented from accessing classified information
by being escorted by cleared personnel. 88 In 1985, then-Defense
Secretary Caspar Weinberger announced his decision to eliminate

ten percent of the security clearances at defense firms.89 Many

companies were able to meet the quota simply by culling those
clearances held by employees who no longer worked on classified
programs and no longer required clearances. 90 Those employees
84. Id. § 154.50. See also Maggrett, "More Than 5,500 People Have Unwarranted Access to D.O.E.," 27 Nucleonics Week, July 17, 1987, No. 29, at 5, reprinted from NEXIS
(information from D.O.E. Inspector General's report indicates that "D.O.E. policy requires
that clearances be withdrawn on employee termination or transfer to areas where clearance is
unnecessary."). The Department of Energy is responsible, among other duties, for making
the Pentagon's nuclear weapons. Greve, supra note 1, at 19A, col. 2.
85. 32 C.F.R. § 159.70(f)(4).
86. Id; see also 32 C.F.R. § 154.13(d) ("Ifan individual departs from a Top Secret billet
to a billet/position involving a lower level clearance, the Top Secret Clearance will be administratively rescinded.").
87. 32 C.F.R. § 154.10(b).
88. 32 C.F.R. § 154.16(f). See, eg., Johnson, Silicon Valley Firms With Defense Contracts Given Fewer Clearances," S.J. Mercury News, Sept. 6, 1987, at A19, col. 1 (defense
consultant whose clearance was revoked had to be escorted to the bathroom).
89. Johnson, supra note 90, at A18,col. 1.
90. Johnson, at A18, col. 2.
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have not been deprived of the right to hold specific employment free
from unreasonable governmental interference, since they continue
to be employed at their old jobs.
An employee has no statutory remedy if security clearance is
revoked on the grounds that access to classified information is no
longer warranted or necessary. The Clearance Review Program
does not apply to administrative withdrawal of a security clearance
without prejudice (Le., where no finding is made which might influence a later determination as to whether the applicant's access to
classified information would be clearly consistent with the national
91
interest).
A clearance which has been administratively suspended can be
reinstated only upon a request submitted by the applicant to the
Director of DISCR, and upon a showing of good cause. Only
D.O.D. Counsel or his designee can approve such a request. 92
Employees of civilian defense contractors whose loss of security clearance also results in the loss of a job are eligible for unemployment compensation benefits. 93
D. Reinvestigation
An employee can move to other companies in the defense contractor industry without having to reapply for a new security clearance if he finds employment within 12 months.94 All D.O.D. offices
will reciprocally accept without additional investigation a determination permitting access to classified information made by authorized Defense Department authorities, 95 a fact which enables
employees to move to jobs with different contractors. Reciprocity
with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Department of
Energy is governed by a separate document, D.O.D. Directive
5210.2.96
The following events, however, can trigger a full reinvestigation of an individual's right to access to classified information: 9 7
91. 32 C.F.R. § 155.2(d).
92. Id. § 155.7(z).
93. See infra text accompanying notes 185-191. See Kanarek v. United States, 394 F.2d
525 (Ct. Cl. 1968). Cf. 26 U.S.C. § 3306 (1988) and Cal. Unemployment Insurance Code
§ 629 et seq., excluding certain employees of the federal government and its instrumentalities
from coverage by state unemployment compensation laws.
94. 32 C.F.R. § 154.14(a), § 154.24.
95. Id. § 154.25(a).
96. Id. § 154.26(c).
97. Id. § 154.19. There are additional categories which apply only to specified D.O.D.
or NATO personnel.
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1. any allegation related to the disqualification criteria outlined
in the statute, with respect to an individual holding a security
clearance;
2. periodic (five-year) reinvestigation of employees of contractors whose duties include any of the following:
a. access to sensitive compartmented information;
b. extraordinary sensitve duties;
c. access to very sensitive information classified Secret;
d. access to Top Secret information; and
e. personnel occupying computer positions designated
ADP-1;
3. to assess the current eligibility of individuals who were denied clearance after an initial investigation if a potential need for
clearance exists;
98
4. break in employment of greater than twelve months;
for a higher level clearance or special access
5. consideration
99
authorization.

Furthermore, if any check of the Defense Central Index of Investigations (a system which contains, among other information, a
record of every issuance, denial or revocation of security clearance
and access to classified information 1°0) reveals any "derogatory information" accumulated against a person since his last security determination, the person will be reinvestigated. 10 1 "Derogatory
information" is not defined in the statute, but "significant derogatory information" is any information that "could, in itself, justify an
unfavorable administrative action, or prompt an adjudicator to seek
additional investigation or clarification." "Unfavorable administrative action" is adverse action taken as the result of personnel security determinations under the statute." °2
E. Administrative Review
Administrative review of the denial or revocation of a security
clearance is dictated by the provisions of the Clearance Review Program and Executive Order 10685.
1. Appellate Process
Within twenty days after the Hearing Examiner makes a determination, which must be in writing and copies of which must be
98. Id. § 154.25(a).
99. Id § 154.25(b)(2).

100. Id. § 154.2(e); see supra text accompanying note 84.
101.

Id. § 154.25(a).

102. Id. § 154.3(x), (cc).
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provided to the applicant and D.O.D. Counsel, either party may file
a written Notice of Appeal with the Director of DISCR, signifying
their intention to appeal the determination. 10 3 The appeal must
also be written, and must be filed with DISCR within sixty days
after the date of the determination. 10 4 The appeal must state the
specific issues raised, must cite those portions of the case record
which support the issues, and must state reasons why the determination should be reversed.'0 Appeal is limited to whether:10 6 the
Examiner's rulings were arbitrary or capricious. The appeal will be
heard with respect to the case record and issues raised on appeal,
without reference to new testimony or evidence.' 0 7
The appeal is submitted to the Appeal Board for consideration.'1 8 The Appeal Board, which is a panel of attorneys designated
by the General Counsel to make final determination,'0 9 decides only
matters of law, and will not review the record de novo or substitute
its judgment for that of the Examiner. 10
The Appeal Board issues a final determination in writing
which either affirms the Examiner's determination or returns the
case to the Examiner with instructions for further action."' The
Appeal Board's written determination is provided to both parties."12
If the case was decided on information to which the applicant was
denied access, only the Secretary of Defense or the agency head
may make a final determination based upon a personal review of the
case. 113

2.

Reimbursement for Loss of Earnings

An applicant to whom DISCR later grants security clearance
after clearance has once been suspended, denied or revoked, may
petition the D.O.D. Counsel for reimbursement of loss of earnings
resulting directly from the suspension, revocation, or denial of
clearance. 114
Claims for reimbursement must be fied "within one year after
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

§ 155.7(r).
§ 155.7(s).
§ 155.7(t).
§ 155.7(u).
§ 155.5(b).

110. Id. § 155.7(s).
111. Id. § 155.7(u).
112. Id.
113. 32 C.F.R. § 155.7(u).
114. Id. § 155.7(w).
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the date the claim arises," which is the date on which DISCR ultimately grants security clearance." 5
The petitioner will not be reimbursed if, in the D.O.D. Counsel
view, the Department of Defense was justified in taking the initial
action to suspend, deny, or revoke clearance."1 6 Claims for reimbursement from agencies other than the Defense Department are
forwarded to that agency." 7
The amount of reimbursement for lost earnings is reduced by
the amount the petitioner was able to earn in the interim period,
subject to "reasonable efforts" on the applicant's part to mitigate
any loss of earnings."8 Interim earnings include any unemployment compensation payments the petitioner received, and the petitioner will not be reimbursed for any period during which loss of
earnings was caused by undue delay resulting from the petitioner's
acts or-failure to act. 119
F. JudicialReview
An employee who has exhausted his administrative remedies
still has recourse in the courts. Generally, "judicial review of factual determinations by agencies is limited to whether, considering
the record as a whole, there is substantial evidence supporting the
findings."' 120 The court will not make a new factual determination
based on its interpretation of the evidence, and will only determine
whether the administrative action was justified.
In February 1988, the U.S. Supreme Court redefined the role
the
courts in reviewing the revocation of security clearance. Speof
cifically, in Department of the Navy v. Egan, 2 ' the Court held that
the Merit Systems Protection Board does not have authority to rule
on the substance of an underlying security-clearance determination
in the course of reviewing an "adverse action."
The case began when Thomas Egan was removed from his job
at the Trident Naval Refit Facility following denial of security
115.

Id. § 155.7(w).

116. Id. § 155.7(w).
117.

55 7
Id. § 1 . (y).

118. Id § 155.7(x).
119. Id.; Kanarek v. United States, 394 F.2d 525, 527 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
120. McKeand v. Laird, 490 F.2d 1262, 1264 (9th Cir. 1973) citing Universal Camera
Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 71 S.Ct. 456 (1951).
121. - U.S. -, 108 S. Ct. 818 (1988). The case concerns a different area of the United
States Code, specifically Title 5, sections 7513 and 7532. That statute governs government
employees in the competitive service, see supra text accompanying note 10. Basic analogies
can be drawn to statutes governing defense industrial contractor personnel, however.
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clearance. It had been made clear to him that his job was contingent on obtaining such clearance.12 2 Egan appealed to the Personnel Security Appeals Board, which affirmed denial of his security
clearance.
He sought review of his removal (not the denial of his clearance) by the Merit Systems Protection Board ("Merit Board"),
which affirmed the action. The Court of Appeals reversed, saying
that the Merit Board could review the merits of the underlying determination. The Supreme Court reinstated the Merit Board decision. The court found that the Merit Board was authorized only to
review an "adverse action,"' 2 3 defined in the statute to include removal, suspension for more than fourteen days, reduction in grade
or pay, and furlough of thirty days or less.124 The Merit Board may
only determine whether the adverse action was taken for cause. In
this instance, the "cause" for Egan's removal was denial of security
clearance. The Court held that the Merit Board was not authorized
to take the additional step of determining whether the denial was
itself justified.' 25
This ruling arguably begs the question: how does the Merit
Board prevent arbitrary removal if it may not determine whether
the "cause" for removal is real or capricious. As noted elsewhere in
this Article, the decision to grant or deny a security clearance is
necessarily subjective. On those grounds, the Court declined to second-guess the agency normally entrusted with that decision. "Certainly," wrote Justice Blackmun for the majority,
it is not reasonably possible for an outside nonexpert body to
review the substance of such a judgment and to decide whether
the agency should have been able to make the necessary affirmative prediction [of possible future behavior] with confidence. Nor
an acceptable marcan such a body determine what constitutes
1 26
gin of error in assessing the potential risk.
The Egan case does not precisely define the level of judicial
review for decisions of the Personnel Security Appeals Board. Nevertheless, the Court has emphasized the doctrine of separation of
powers, finding that "the grant of security clearance to a particular
employee, a sensitive and inherently discretionary judgment call, is
committed by law to the appropriate agency of the Executive
122.
123.

Id. at 820.
Id. at 825.

124. Id., citing 5 U.S.C.S. §§ 7513(d), 7512.
125. Id. at 825.
126.

Id.
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Branch."' 2 7 Such language makes it unlikely that an employee can
get judicial review on the merits of a denial or revocation of security
clearance.

Although the court's role is one of judicial restraint, however,
it will not hesitate to intervene to prevent "arbitrary and unreasona-

ble governmental action." A court will look for a "rational relationship" between the applicant's conduct and the actions taken by

the administrative body. 2 ' If the applicant has cooperated fully,
the, burden will be on the government to prove that rational
nexus. 129
IV.

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY PROCEDURES

A. Application

The statute which implements Executive Order 10865 for the
Department of Energy is entitled "Criteria and Procedures for De-

termining Eligibility for Access to Classified Matter or Significant
Quantities of Special Nuclear Material". 3 0 It applies to questions

of eligibility for access to "Restricted Data or significant quantities
of special nuclear material" involving employees of and applicants
for employment with contractors and agents of the D.O.E. 311

The D.O.E. statute is not much different from the Defense Department statute in substance, although it is clearer and easier to
follow. The D.O.E. standard for granting clearance (called "access
authorization") is a "comprehensive, commonsense judgment" as to
whether granting access "would endanger the common defense and

security and would be clearly consistent with the national interest."' 3 2 The criteria which the D.O.E. generally applies (i.e., the
"principal types of derogatory information" which pose a question

regarding eligibility for access) are reprinted at Appendix B to this
127. Id. at 824.
128. Marks v. Schlesinger, 384 F. Supp. 1373, 1376 (D.C. Cal. 1974); Gayer v. Laird,
332 F. Supp. 169, 171 (D. D.C. 1971).
129. 384 F. Supp. at 1379.
130. "Criteria and Procedures for Determining Eligibility For Access to Classified Matter or Significant Quantities of Special Nuclear Material," 10 C.F.R. Part 710 (Jan. 1, 1986).
131. 10 C.F.R. § 710.1(a), § 710.2(a). "Restricted Data" is defined at 10 CF.R.
§ 725.3(h) as "all data concerning (1) design, manufacture or utilization of atomic weapons;
(2) the production of special nuclear material; or (3) the use of special nuclear material in the
production of energy, but shall not include data declassified or removed from the Restricted
Data category pursuant to section 142 of the [Atomic Energy Act of 1954]." Part 725 governs permits for access to Restricted Data. "Significant quantities of special nuclear material"
is defined at 10 C.F.R. § 710.5(b), and includes a variety of radioactive and other chemical
elements.

132.

10 C.F.R. § 710.10(a).
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Article. The D.O.E. warns that these criteria are not exhaustive,
nor is the D.O.E. precluded from deciding that information or facts
are derogratory "although at variance with, or outside the scope of,
the stated categories.' 13 3
B. Investigation
If information furnished to the D.O.E. creates a question as to
an individual's eligibility for access authorization, the matter is
turned over to the Manager of Operations at the D.O.E. Operations
Office. The Manager of Operations may conduct interview or further investigation as he deems appropriate, and may authorize the
access authorization. If the question of eligibility cannot be resolved through further investigation and psychiatric evaluation, the
Manager of Operations must forward the case to the Director of the
Office of Safeguards and Security of the D.O.E. 3 That office then
has thirty days to grant access authorization, direct further investigation, or authorize hearing procedures in accordance with the

statute.135
C. Hearing: Post-Investigation
If interviews and other investigation cannot resolve a question
as to eligibility for access authorization, the statute dictates procedures to be followed in the conduct of hearings. 136 Pending a final
determination, the Manager of Operations may suspend any current
access authorization of the individual. In reaching this decision,
he/she should consider such factors as the seriousness of the derogatory information developed, the individual's possible access to classified information or significant quantities of special nuclear
material, and the individual's opportunity to commit acts adversely
affecting the national security. 137 The Manager of Operations must
immediately notify the Assistant for Defense Programs of any suspension of access authorization, and within ten days must submit a
request for authority to conduct a hearing to the Director, Office of
Safeguards and Security. The request must contain an explanation
13
of the basis for the suspension.
Within thirty days after the Director authorizes review proce133. Id. § 710.10(b).
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id. § 710.10(c).
Id.
Id. § 710.20 et seq.
Id. § 710.21.
Id.
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dures, the Manager of Operations must notify the individual in
writing that "reliable information in [his] possession.., has created
a substantial doubt concerning the individual's eligibility to access
authorization" and outlining procedures for the person to follow if
he wishes to request a hearing.1 39 The person must be given additional information and a copy of the statute. 14°
If the individual does not request a hearing within twenty days
after receiving the notification letter, the Manager of Operations
will recommend to the Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs
the final action to be taken on the basis of the information in the
14
case. 1

If the individual timely requests a hearing, the Manager of Operations will assign a D.O.E. attorney to act as Hearing Counsel, to
prepare and conduct hearings as provided in the statute. 142 Once
arrangements have been made with the individual (or counsel for
the individual) for an "expeditious hearing," the Hearing Officer
will consider the evidence, make specific findings as to the truth of
the derogatory information, and determine whether to recommend
143
the grant, denial, or revocation of access authorization.
The individual may challenge the Hearing Officer for cause
within seventy-two hours after being notified of the Hearing Officer's identity. The Manager of Operations will rule on the challenge and, if need be, appoint a new Hearing Officer who may also
be challenged." 4
The individual will receive at least one week's notice of the
hearing. If he/she fails to appear, the Manager of Operations will
recommend final action based on the record to date. The hearing
can be rescheduled upon a showing of good cause.' 4 5
The Hearing Officer proceedings must commence a hearing
within ninety days from the date the request for a hearing is received.146 Throughout, the statute emphasizes that the proceeding
is an administrative hearing and not a trial. As with the D.O.D.
procedures, the Federal Rules of Evidence serve only as a guide. 4 7
Hearings are open only to duly authorized staff of the D.O.E., the
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id. §
Id. §
Id. §
Id. §
Id. §
Id. §
Id. §
Id. §
Id. §

710.22.
710.23.
710.24(a).
710.25(a),
710.26(a),
710,26(c),
710.26(e).
710.27(a).
710.27(g);

§ 710.5(e).
§ 710.5(g).
§ 710.26(d).

see supra text accompanying note 79.
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individual, counsel, and such other people as the Hearing Officer
may authorize.14
During the course of the proceedings, the notification letter
may be amended to correspond to the evidence received.149 Generally, the record may not contain any information adverse to the individual unless that information has been made available to the
individual and he either has no objection to presentation of the information or he is afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the
person providing the information. 150 The exceptions to this right of
cross-examination are the same as those under D.O.D. procedures
discussed above." 1 Unlike the D.O.D. procedures, however, the
D.O.E. specifies that when the individual is denied access to information or adverse witnesses, he must be provided with a summary
of the information "as comprehensive and detailed as the national
security permits," and appropriate weight is to be given to the fact
that the individual was denied the right to confront the witnesses. 5 2
Records and other physical evidence may be received on terms substantially similar to the D.O.D. procedures. 153 Again, the individual is to be provided with a summary or description of any evidence
which he is prohibited to inspect, to the extent that national secur154
ity permits.
A transcript of the hearings is prepared and, except for portions containing Restricted Data or national security information, a
copy furnished to the individual.155
D. Written Findings: Determination
The Hearing Officer makes specific findings as to each allegation contained in the notification letter, and must support each finding with a statement of his reasons for such findings. 5 6 The
Hearing Officer bases his recommendation on whether he is of the
opinion that granting access authorization "will not endanger the
common defense and security and will be clearly consistent with the
148. Id. § 710.27(b); cf. 32 C.F.R. § 155.7(h) ("Hearings will be closed to spectators
except upon mutual agreement of applicant and D.O.D. Counsel based on the necessity to
protect classification information or other good cause").
149. 10 C.F.R. § 710.270).
150. Id. § 710.27(k).
151. Id. § 710.27(m); see supra text accompanying notes 58 & 59.
152. 10 C.F.R. § 710.27(n).
153. Id. § 710.27(o), § 710.27(p); see supra text accompanying note 60.
154. 10 C.F.R. § 710.27(p)(3).
155. Id. § 710.27(r).
156. Id. § 710.28(b).
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national interest."15 7 The Hearing Officer must submit his recommendation to the Manager of Operations within thirty days of the
later of (a) receipt of the transcript, or (b) the closing of the record. 5 ' New evidence can be heard if it is discovered prior to final
determination of eligibility for access authorization. 159
The Manager of Operations transmits the Hearing Officer's
findings and recommendation to the Assistant Secretary for Defense
Programs through the Director of the Division [sic] of Safeguards
and Security." 6 If the Hearing Officer has recommended that access authorization be denied, the Manager of Operations must also
submit a statement of the effect of such denial on the energy research and development program. 6
If the Hearing Officer recommends that access authorization be
denied, the individual will immediately be notified of that fact and
may request that his case be reviewed by the D.O.E. Personnel Security Review Examiner. The request for review must be submitted
within five days to the Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs,
and a brief supporting the individual's position should be submitted
to the Assistant Secretary within ten days, via the Director of the
Division [sic] of Safeguards and Security.' 62 If the individual does
not request review within the prescribed period of time, the final
determination will be made on the basis of the records and all findings and recommendations.' 6 3
The Assistant Secretary of Defense Programs designates three
D.O.E. Personnel Security Review Examiners to review the record
of the case. The Examiners conduct their reviews independently of
one another, and prepare individual reports of findings and recommendations for the Assistant Secretary." 6 Each finding and recommendation must be fully supported by stated reasons for those
conclusions, and Examiners generally submit reports within forty1 65
five days after they are assigned the case.
Based on the record and all recommendations, the Assistant
Secretary for Defense Program makes a final determination as to
whether access authorization should be granted or denied. If the
157.
158.

Id. § 710.28(c).
Id. § 710.28(d).

159. See id. § 710.29.
160. Id. § 710.30(b).
161.
162.
163.

Id.

Id. § 710.30(d)(1).
Id. § 710.30(d)(3).

164. Id. § 710.31(a), § 710.31(d).
165. Id. § 710.31(d).
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decision is to deny access authorization, the Assistant Secretary will
so notify the individual through the Manager of Operations and include his findings with respect to each allegation contained in the
166
notification letter.
If the individual has been denied the opportunity to confront
and cross-examine witnesses who have furnished information adverse to him, and if the Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs
reaches an adverse recommendation, the Secretary (head of the
D.O.E.) will personally review the record and make a final determination.16 7 A decision to revoke or deny access authorization will be
forwarded to the individual on the same terms as above. 168
E. Reconsideration
1. When Access Authorization Granted
If the Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs or the Secretary has made a determination granting access authorization, eligibility will only be reconsidered if there is new "substantially
derogatory information" or a "significant increase in the scope or
sensitivity of the Restricted Data or national security information to
which the individual has or will have access." 169 If the Manager of
Operations granted access authorization without recourse to the
hearing procedures, the determination can also be reconsidered
with the specific prior approval of the Director of the Division [sic]
of Safeguards and Security of the D.O.E. 170
2.

When Access Authorization Denied or Revoked

A determination denying access authorization will be reconsid17
ered under the following circumstances: '
(a) the individual has received a bona fide offer of employment
requiring access to Restricted Data, national security information, or significant quantities of special nuclear material; and
(b) there is either
(i) material and relevant new evidence which the individual
and his representatives are not at fault in failing to present
earlier, or
166. Id. § 710.32(a), § 710.32(c).
167. Id. § 710.33(a).
168. Id. § 710.33(b); see supra text accompanying note 177.
169. Id. § 710.34(a).

170. Id. § 710.34(c).
171.

Id. § 710.34(b).
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(ii) convincing evidence of the individual's reformation or
rehabilitation.
Requests for reconsideration should be submitted in writing to
the Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs through the Manager
of Operations with jurisdiction over the position for which access
authorization is required. The request must be accompanied by an
affidavit setting forth in detail the new evidence of reformation or
rehabilitation.17 2
The process for judicial review is the same as for any other
administrative action.1 73 No provision is made for reimbursement
of lost earnings.
V.

CALIFORNIA WRONGFUL DISCHARGE LAWS

In California, an employment with no specific term may be terminated at the will of either party, upon notice to the other party. 174
Absent agreement to the contrary, an employer may terminate an at
will employment having no specified term, with or without cause. 175
The terms of the individual contract may vary these rules, and the
employer is bound to follow its own internal regulations.1 76 A contract for a specified term of employment may also be terminated
upon notice of the occurrence of a specified condition to the employment. 177 It could be argued however that recission of an employee's security clearance through no fault of the employee's but
due to some act of the employer constitutes constructive
178
discharge.
The employee's remedy for a perceived wrongful discharge is
an action in tort for wrongful discharge, or a combined action in
tort and contract for the employer's breach of the implied covenant
172. Id.
173. See supra text accompanying notes 131-140.
174. Cal. Lab. Code § 2922.
175. Id 29 Cal. Jur. 3d, Employer and Employee § 62 and cases cited therein.
176. Rulon-Miller v. Int'l Business Machines Corp., 162 Cal. App. 3d 241, 249-251, 208
Cal. Rptr. 524, 530-531 (1984).
177. See McPharlin, Risk Management for Employers: Terminating Poor Performers
Without Legal Liability, (this issue) 4 S. C. Comp. & H. Tech. L. J. (1988). Koehrer v.
Superior Court, 181 Cal. App. 3d 1155, 226 Cal. Rptr. 820 (1986). Nattini v. Dewey, 96 Cal.
App. 2d 545, 216 P.2d 46 (1950).
178. See, eg., Billetter v. Posell, 94 Cal. App. 2d 858, 211 P.2d 621 (1949) (notification
that employee's wages and position have been reduced below what contract calls for is constructive discharge); Gregg v. McDonald, 73 Cal. App. 748, 239 P. 373 (1925) (discharge
from the position one is employed to fill is a discharge from employment); 63 ALR 3d 539,
"Reduction in rank or authority or change in duties as breach of employment contract."
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of good faith and fair dealing.179 Before turning to the courts with
any action, the employee must first exhaust all administrative
1 80
remedies.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The decision to grant security clearance and access to classified
information to an individual reflects "an attempt to predict [the individual's] possible future behavior and to assess whether, under
compulsion of circumstances or for other reasons, he might compromise sensitive information." 8 ' Such a prediction cannot be
made with any degree of certainty. For this reason, and because of
the doctrine of separation of powers, the courts are content to allow
the executive branch broad discretion in determining who may have
18 2
access to classified information.
Due to the imprecise nature of the decision, an elaborate procedural mechanism has been devised in an attempt to make the process reasonably objective. Thus, in the Defense Department, the
Personnel Security Program sets standards for granting clearance,
and the Clearance Review Program establishes a review process for
any adverse determination. The Department of Energy has an
equivalent system.
Reasonable people may differ on the criteria to which the standard of "clearly consistent with the interests of the national security" is applied. For instance, in light of the 1987 incident in which
U.S. Marine guards were seduced by Soviet women while KGB
agents gained access to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, 8 3 the military's insistence that homosexuality predisposes one to vulnerability
to coercion or blackmail seems outdated. Nevertheless, the courts
will not substitute their own criteria for that developed by the agencies responsible for classified information.
An employee of an industrial defense contractor whose clearance is either denied or revoked has the same remedies whether the
cause was an act or omission of the employee, or an act or omission
179. See L. McPharlin, Risk Managementfor Employers: Terminating PoorPerformers
Without LegalLiability, (this issue) 4 S.C. COMP. & H. TECH. L.J. (1988). Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980).
180. Wise v. Southern Pacific Co., 223 Cal. App. 2d 50, 35 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1963); 32
ALR 4th 350, "Failure to pursue or exhaust remedies under union contract as affecting employee's right of state civil action for retaliatory discharge"; 29 Cal. Jur. 3d, Employer and
Employee § 70, p. 653.
181. Egan, at 824.
182. Id. at 825.
183. See, eg., Martz, The Fiasco in Moscow, NEWSWEEK 20 (Apr. 13, 1987).
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of the employer. But if the employer has denied or revoked clearance without cause, Le., if the employee still requires access to classified information in order to perform his job, and none of the
criteria for determining eligibility for clearance apply to him, then
the employee has a very good chance of succeeding on the merits in
an appeal. The employer will bb required to present evidence supporting his decision, and clearance will be granted or reinstated if
the allegations are unfounded. Although the statutes and the courts
allow broad discretion, they do not permit an employer to make
arbitrary and capricious decisions. And, if the employer's allegations are found to cast some doubt over whether the employee's
access to classified information is clearly consistent with the interests of national security, the employee still has recourse in the laws
of wrongful discharge. In either case, the employee is assured due
process under the law.

19881

LOSS OR DENIAL OF SECURITY CLEARANCE

APPENDIX A
184
ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA FOR CLEARANCE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

The criteria for determining eligibility for clearance under the
standard [of clearly consistent with the national interest] shall include, but not be limited to the following:
(1) Commission of any act of sabotage, espionage, treason, terrorism, anarchy, sedition, or attempts thereat or preparation therefor, or conspiring with or aiding or abetting another to commit or
attempt to commit any such act.
(2) Establishing or continuing a sympathetic association with
a saboteur, spy, traitor, seditionist, anarchist, terrorist, revolutionist, or with an espionage or other secret agent or similar representative of a foreign nation whose interests may be inimical to the
interest of the United States, or with any person who advocates the
use of force or violence to overthrow the Government of the United
States or to alter the form of the Government of the United States
by unconstitutional means.
(3) Advocacy or use of force or violence to overthrow the
Government of the United States or to alter the form of government
of the United States by unconstitutional means.
(4) Knowing membership with the specific intent of furthering
the aims of or adherence to and active participation in any foreign
or domestic organization, association, movement, group or combination of persons (hereafter referred to as organizations) which unlawfully advocates or practices the commission of acts of force or
violence to prevent others from exercising their rights under the
Constitution or laws of the United States or of any State or which
seeks to overthrow the Government of the United States or any
State or subdivision thereof by unlawful means.
(5) Unauthorized disclosure to any person of classified information, or of other information, disclosure of which is prohibited
by Statute, Executive Order, or Regulation.
(6) Performing or attempting to perform one's duties, acceptance and active maintenance of dual citizenship, or other acts conducted in a manner which serve [sic] or could be expected to serve
the interests of another government in preference to the interests of
the United States.
(7) Disregard of public law, Statutes, Executive Orders or
Regulations, including violation of security regulations or practices.
184. 32 C.F.R. § 155.6(e) (May 6, 1987); 32 C.F.R. § 154.7 (April 8, 1987).
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(8) Criminal or dishonest conduct.
(9) Acts of omission or commission that indicate poor judgment, unreliability or untrustworthiness.
(10) Any behavior or illness, including any mental condition,
which, in the opinion of competent medical authority, may cause a
defect in judgment or reliability with due regard to the transient or
continuing effect of the illness and the medical findings in such case.
(11) Vulnerability to coercion, influence, or pressure that may
cause conduct contrary to the national interest. This may be the
presence of immediate family members or other persons to whom
the applicant is bonded by affection or obligation in a nation (or
areas under its domination) whose interests may be inimical to
those of the United States, or any other circumstances that could
cause the applicant to be vulnerable.
(12) Excessive indebtedness, recurring financial difficulties, or
unexplained affluence.
(13) Habitual or episodic use of intoxicants to excess.
(14) Illegal or improper use, possession, transfer, sale or addiction to any controlled or psychoactive substance, narcotic, cannabis
or other dangerous drug.
(15) Any knowing and willful falsification, cover-up, concealment, misrepresentation, or omission of a material fact from any
written or oral statement, document, form or other representation
or device used by the Department of Defense or any other Federal
agency.
(16) Failing or refusing to answer or to authorize others to answer questions or provide information required by a Congressional
committee, court of agency in the course of an official inquiry whenever such answers or information concern relevant and material
matters pertinent to an evaluation of the individual's trustworthiness, reliability, and judgment.
(17) Acts of sexual misconduct or perversion indicative of
moral turpitude, poor juidgment, or lack of regard for the laws of
society.

19881
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APPENDIX B
185
ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA FOR CLEARANCE
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

The principal types of derogatory information which create a
question as to the individual's eligibility for access authorization include, but are not limited to, cases in which the individual has:
(1) Committed, prepared or attempted to commit, or aided,
abetted or conspired with another to commit or attempt to commit
any act of sabotage, espionage, treason, or sedition.
(2) Knowingly established or continued a sympatheticassociation with a saboteur, spy, traitor, seditionist, anarchist, or revolutionist, espionage agent, or representative of a foreign nation whose
interests are inimical to the interests of the United States, or with
any person advocating the use of force or violence to overthrow the
Government of the United States by unconstitutional means.
(3) Knowingly held membership in or had a knowing affiliation with, or has taken action which evidences a sympathetic association with the intent of furthering the aims of, or adherence to, and
active participation in any foreign or domestic organization, association, movement, group or combination of persons which advocates
or practices the commission of acts of force or violence to prevent
others from exercising their rights under the Constitution or Laws
of the United States or any state or subdivision thereof by unlawful
means.
(4) Publicly or privately advocates, or participates in the activities of a group or organization, which has as its goal, revolution by
force or violence to overthrow the Government of the United States
or the alteration of the form of Government of the United States by
unconstitutional means with the knowledge that it will further those
goals.
(5) Parent(s), brother(s), sister(s), spouse, or offspring residing
in a nation whose interests may be inimical to the interests of the
United States, or in satellites or occupied areas thereof (to be evaluated in the light of the risk that pressure applied through such relatives could force the individual to act contrary to national security).
(6) Has deliberately misrepresented, falsified, or omitted significant information from a Personnel Security Questionaire, a personnel qualifications statement, or a personnel security interview.
(7) Has failed to protect classified information, or safeguard
special nuclear material; or has willfully violated or disregarded se185.

10 C.F.R. §§ 710.10, 710.11 (Jan. 1, 1986).
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curity or safeguards regulations to a degree which would endanger
the common defense and security or has intentionally disclosed
classified information to a person unauthorized to receive such
information.
(8) Has an illness or mental condition of a nature which in the
opinion of competent medical authority causes or may cause, significant defect in the judgment or reliability of the individual, or has
refused to be examined by a psychiatrist.
(9) Has refused to testify before a Congressional Committee,
Federal or state court, or Federal administrative body, regarding
charges relevant to eligibility for DOE access authorization.
(10) Is a user of alcohol habitually to excess, or has been such
without adequate evidence of rehabilitation or reformation.
(11) Has used, trafficked in, sold, transferred or possessed a
drug or other substance listed in the schedule of Controlled Substances established pursuant to section 202 of the Controlled Substances Act of 1970 (such as amphetamines, barbiturates, narcotics,
etc.) except as prescribed or administered by a physician licensed to
dispense drugs in the practice of medicine, without adequate evidence of rehabilitation or reformation.
(12) Has engaged in any unusual conduct or is subject to any
circumstances which tend to show that the individual is not honest,
reliable, or trustworthy, and there is no adequate evidence of rehabilitation or reformation; or which furnishes reason to believe that
the individual may be subject to coercion, influence, or pressure
which may cause the individual to act contrary to the best interests
of the national security. Such conduct or circumstances include but
are not limited to sexual activity, demonstrated financial irresponsibility or notoriously disgraceful conduct.

